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N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES KINNE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

Case No.
16447

Defendant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a review of the Findings and Order entered
by the Industrial Commission of Utah on February 23, 1979

and Supplemental Order dated March 27, 1979 in the matter
of Susan Wynn, Widow of Max L. Wynn, deceased, vs. Freeport
Transport, Inc., State Insurance Fund and Charles Kinne.
DISPOSITION OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Industrial Commission entered a finding that
the decedent, May L. Wynn, was in the course of his
employment at the time of his death and by Supplemental
Order held that the decedent was an employee of the plaintiff.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
The plaintiff requests this Court to set aside
the finding of the Industrial Commission and the award
made on the grounds that the facts do not support the
award.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about May 12, 1976, Charles W. Kinne
entered into an Agreement with Freeport Transport,
Inc. whereby Kinne would lease his tractor to Freeport
for their use and benefit.

(R321-328)

The Agreement

defined Freeport as Carrier and Kinne as Contractor.
The pertinent parts of the Agreement provide:
"During the entire term hereof, the
sole possession, responsibility for
and control and direction of the
vehicular equipment described above
and the drivers thereof, whether
employees of Contractor or Carrier,
shall reside in Carrie~." (R322)
"Contractor shall be solely
responsible for the direction and
control of employees, agents and
servants of Contractor, including
selecting, hiring, supervising,
directing, setting wages, hours and
working conditions, and paying and
adjusting grievances of the
employees." (R323)
"No other provisions of this Agreement
shall be interpreted or construed
as creating or establishing the
relationship of employer and employee
between Carrier and Contractor or any
driver, agent, servant, or any other
employee of Contractor." (R324)
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"Contractor shall maintain workmans
compensation coverage for all
employees, agents or servants
employed by the Contractor in the
performance of this contract." (R326)
"Proof of such coverage (workmans
compensation) as is required by this
paragraph and notice to Carrier of
cancellations thereof shall be
submitted to Contractor by Carrier."
(R326)
"Carrier assumes liability for bodily
injuries to or the death of any person
other than Contractor, the employees,
agents or servants of Contractor
resulting from the negligent operation,
maintenance or use of the vehicle
described herein." (R325)
"Carrier shall maintain insurance for
the aforesaid liabilities, injuries,
losses or damages as required by the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the
State and other governmental
authorities." (R326)
Kinne failed to get workmans compensation coverage
and Freeport Transport, Inc. failed to require proof of the
workmans compensation coverage as required by the Lease
Agreement.

(R232)

Approximately the last part of October, Max L. Nynn,
a theretofore unemployed truck driver, found a job
answering an advertisement for A & K Railroad Materialswho referred him to Mr. Kinne.

(R52)

The application of employment came from A & K
Railroad Materials.

(R54)

A & K Railroad Materials and

Freeport Transport, Inc. have common stockholders and
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q

share space in the same building at Freeport Center.
(R80)

Mr. Wynn had to pass a road test and written test

administered by Freeport Transport, Inc. in order to
become employed.

(R56-58)

Freeport Transport, Inc. made

sure all drivers took the physical required by the
Department of Transporation.

Freeport Transport, Inc.

required the drivers to call each day so they could
schedule their freight.

(R60)

Freeport Transport, Inc.

administered all the record keeping required by the
Department of Transportation as it referred to the
records kept by the drivers.

(R78)

All trip envelopes

and supplies were furnished by Freeport Transport, Inc.
to the drivers.

(RlOl)

Signs were placed on the sides

of the tractor indicating it was engaged in the business
of Freeport Transport, Inc.

(R258)

All safety standards

for drivers and equipment were administered and controlled
by Freeport Transport, Inc.

(R87)

If problems arose will

the driver refusing to take loads or failing to perform
in a manner satisfactory to Freeport Transport, Inc.,
they would request di&ciplinary action by Mr. Kinne and
on at least one occasion at the request of Freeport,
Mr. Kinne discharged one of his drivers for failing to
perform in a satisfactory manner.

(R89, 90, 143, 221)

Freeport Transport, Inc. was the ICC carrier and
ultimately responsible to the ICC for their drivers.
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(R81)

On November 9, 1976, Max L. Wynn picked up his
load at Paonia, Colorado and arrived in Price, Utah at
1:00 p.rn.

This was a Tuesday.

On November 10, 1976,

he drove from Price and arrived at Clearfield
approximately 10:00 a.m.

(R91-93)

The nature of

Mr. Wynn's load prevented him from driving at night or
on weekends or holidays and there was some indication
that there may have been a holiday corning up in Nevada
on the following Thursday or Friday.

It took Mr. Wynn

eight hours of driving to get from Paonia, Colorado to
Clearfield, Utah which computed out to an average fifty
miles per hour rate of travel.

His ultimate destination.

was Milpitas, California which could have been driven in.
an additional sixteen hours traveling at fifty miles
per hour.

(R91-96)

Mr. Wynn decided to return to

Clearfield rather than proceed directly to California.
During the next couple of days he ran shag loads for
Freeport Transport, Inc. and was then instructed to
proceed to California the next Monday, November

15~

1976.

(R295-298)
There was no requirement, either by Charles Kinne
or Freeport Transport, Inc., that Mr. Wynn take his
tractor home.

(R37, 134, 187, 217)

On at least one

occasion, his wife had taken him to Freeport Transport,
Inc. to start a trip.

(R37)

On this particular occasion,
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he took the tractor home and on November 15, 1976,
while proceeding towards Freeport Transport, Inc. to
start the completion of his trip to California, he
drove around a crossing guard at a railroad track and
was struck by a train and killed.

(R201-202)

The widow of Max L. Wynn, Susan Wynn, filed
her claim for workmans compensation benefits naming
Freeport Transport, Inc., Charles Kinne and the State
Insurance Fund as defendants.

The State Insurance Fund

was the insurer of Freeport Transport, Inc.

Charles

Kinne had no workmans compensation insurance.

The

matter was heard on October 5, 1977 before the
Honorable Joseph C. Foley.
On July 25, 1978, Joseph C. Foley, the
Administrative Law Judge, entered his Findings and
Conclusions.

In the Findings Joseph Foley stated:

"Max L. Wynn was a statutory employee of Freeport
Transport, Inc. and not of Charles Kinne by virtue of
the· amount of control and direction provided to
Freeport

Transport~

Inc~

in the Lease Agreement entered

into by Charles Kinne and Freeport Transport, Inc." (R404)
As a conclusion of law, Judge Foley held that Max L. Wynn
was not in the scope and course of his employment at
the time of his fatal accident and compensation benefits
were therefore denied.

(R404)
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Thereafter, the widow filed a Motion for Review
and on February 23, 1979 the Industrial Commission
granted the Motion.

(R438)

The Commission, although

not specifically deciding that Max L. Wynn was not the
employee of Charles Kinne, implied that they were
concurring in the Administrative Law Judge's decision
that he was only the employee of Freeport Transport,
Inc.

The Commission further held that Mr. Wynn was in

the course of his employment at the time of his fatal
accident and the 0idow was therefore entitled to
benefits.

By letter dated March 19, 1979, the lawyer

representing the State Insurance Fund requested the
Commission to clarify its Order as to whether or not
there was any joint liability of Charles.Kinne with
the statutory employer, State Insurance Fund, for the
payment of benefits.

(R448)

By Supplemental Order dated March 27, 1979,
the Commission held that Max L. Wynn was the employee
of Charles Kinne pursuant to the Lease Agreement and,
therefore, Charles Kinne was jointly and severally
liable for the compensation award to the widow.

(R450)

On April 6, 1979 Charles Kinne objected to the
Supplemental Order and requested further review which
was denied on April 18, 1979.

(R453-456)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
MAX L. WYNN WAS OUTSIDE THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT
AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT CAUSING HIS DEATH.
The evidence at the hearing established that
there was no requirement for Mr. Wynn to use the
tractor to go to and from work.

He would occasionally

take it home for the purpose of servicing the tractor,
but there was no requirement, either from Freeport
Transport, Inc. or Charles Kinne, that he keep the truck
at his home.

There was adequate space at Freeport Transport

Inc. to park the truck and keep it when it was not in use.
It is clear that Mr. Wynn's election to go to Clearfield
rather than to drive on to California which was his
ultimate destination was his own choice and not at the
direction of or for the benefit of his employer.

It

was well established that Mr. Wynn had sufficient time,
even assuming there may have been a holiday in Nevada,
to deliver his load to Milpitas, California by Friday
evening.
In Barney v. Industrial Commission, 550 P. 2d
1271 (1973), the deceased was a bricklayer who was killed
in an automobile accident while returning home from work.
He lived more than sixty miles from the job site and
pursuant to the agreement with his employer, was paid
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an additional $1.75 per hour for traveling time when
his job was more than sixty miles from his labor union
temple.
The Court held that since the employer had no
control over where the deceased lived or how he g·ot to
work, he was deemed not to be in the course of his
employment while going to and from the premises where
he was employed.

Barney can only be distinguished from

the present case by the fact that the decedent,
Max L. Wynn, was driving Charles Kinne's tractor at
the time of his death.

The election to drive the

tractor by Mr. Wynn was his own since there was no
requirement that he do so.
In Greer v. Industrial Commission, 290 P. 900,
it was established that an employee going home from his
place of employment and not on any special mission for
his employer was not in the· course of his employment at
the time of his accident.

The Court stated that the

fact the employee was carrying a saw belonging to the
employer which was hi& duty to keep sharp was only
incidental.
In the present case, the fact that Mr. Wynn
happened to be in the tractor as opposed to his own
personal transportation was also incidental and not .
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for the benefit of his employer.
The three cases cited by the applicant in her
Motion for Review are all distinguishable from the
present case.

In Bailey v. Industrial Commission,

398 P. 2d 545 (1965), it was the decedent's regular and
definite duty to take the vehicle to his work each
morning.

Mr. Wynn, on the other hand, had no definite

duty to take the vehicle home.
In Mosher v. Industrial Commission, 440 P. 2d
23 (1968)·, Mosher was injured while carrying out specific
instructions from his employer as to how he should start
the truck.

It was the carrying out of these instructions

from his employer that subsequently caused his burns and
disability.

-The

de~edent,

Max L. Wynn, was under no

instructions to drive the truck and specifically was
under no instructions to drive around a railroad crossing
guard in a negligent fashion which subsequently resulted
in his death.
In Hafers, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 526
P.

2d 1188, the employee was injured while working on an

automobile assigned to him and whose definite duties
included keeping the automobile in a safe and efficient
condition.

The plaintiff agrees that had Mr. Wynn been

injured while working on the tractor, he would have been
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in the course of his employment, but that is not the
fact situation and is clearly distinguishable.
POINT II

MAX L. WYNN WAS NOT A STATUTORY EMPLOYEE OF CHARLES KINNE
AND CHARLES KINNE THEREFORE HAS NO JOINT LIABILITY FOR
WORKMANS COMPENSATION.
No appeal has been filed by Freeport Transport,
Inc. or the State Insurance Fund contesting the finding
that Max L. Wynn was the statutory employee of Freeport
Transport, Inc.

The Supplemental Order entered by the

Industrial Commission on March 27, 1979 imposed joint and
several liability on Charles Kinne.

The pertinent

language states:
"We also find that the Lease Agreement
made Mr. Charles Kinne the decedent's
employer and although not exercised,
he did have the right of control over
the drivers enough, we conclude, to
have made Mr. Wynn an employee of
Mr. Kinne. We therefore conclude that
the decedent was statutorily employed
by Freeport Transport, Inc. and was
also an employee of Mr. Kinne pursuant
to the Lease Agreement which also
required that Mr. Kinne carry wor.kmans
compensation coverage for his drivers."
It is submitted that the Commission has exceeded its
powers

~Y

imposing compensation liability on Charles Kinne

through interpretation of a contract between Charles Kinne
and Freeport Transport, Inc.

It has clearly been found

and held that all of the pertinent aspects of control
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z:::q

were exclusively those of Freeport Transport, Inc.
Most of the cases cited in Charles Kinne's
original Memorandum to the Commission involved similar
lease arrangements as the one used by Kinne and
Freeport.

~n

each of the cases, the interstate

carrier was considered the sole responsible employer
for purposes of workmans compensation and no joint or
several liability was imposed upon the middleman in
the lease arrangement.
In Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v.
Major, 226 N .E. 2d 74 (-Ill. 1967) , the Court considered
a similar issue involving the workmans compensation
liability of Major to drivers of leased trucks under a
similar lease arrangement.
Major claimed they were not employees because
they could make deliveries by any route they chose; they
could hire other persons to drive their trucks; they
could trip lease to other carriers; they were required
to pay for repairs, gasoline, oil, tires, equipment and
licenses; they were paid by the job not on a time basis;
they did not receive a payroll check; they paid the
collision insurance on their vehicles; and Major did not
withhold any income tax from the money which he paid to
them.
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The Court held they were employees on two bases.
First was the common law basis to determine whether one
is an employer or an independent contractor.

The Court

found the language of the lease was equivalent to a
provision that Major had a right to fire the drivers;
that Major in fact did threaten to withhold drivers'
checks; Major.did require the drivers to show how their
time was spent while on trips; that the drivers could
not trip lease without first calling the office; that
they could not take a load from a certain dispatch point
without first being dispatched by the office; that they
were not to directly call shippers in one area; and that
Major told them where to load and unload.

The Court,

applying the standard "Right to Control" test, determined
that the drivers in question were employees of Major.
The Court went on to hold:

"We find the trial

Court was correct in its decision for another and more
cogent reason -- that Major was a_motor. carrier of goods
in interstate commerce operating under authority of a
certificate of license issued by the Interstate Commerce
Commission."

The Court went on quoting from §304(e) of

Title 49, united

s~ates

Code Annotated, and from 49

C.F.R. 1057, both of which require that all leases
provide for exclusive possession, control and use of
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the equipment and for complete assumption of
responsibility in respect thereto.
The Court quotes from the holding of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in Brown v. L. H.
Bottoms Truck Lines, 117 N.C. 299, 42 S.E. 2d 71, wherein
the Court said at page 75:
"The transportation of goods in
interstate commerce by motor vehicles
was required to be under the rules
and regulations of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Brown
truck could only have been used in
such transportation by the defendant
franchise carrier as one of its fleet
of trucks under its license plates.
Hence, it would seem to follow that
control of the operation for the
period of the lease was given to the
licensed carrier, and that the owner
driven truck was in contemplation of
law in its employ and the driver for
the trip stood in the relationship
of its employee, as found by the
Industrial Commission."
"We think the applicable rule, under
the facts here presented, is that
the lease or contract by which the
equipment of the authorized interstate
carrier was augmented, must be
interpreted as carrying the necessary
implication that possession and control
of the added vehicle was, for the trip,
vested in the authorized operator."
In Proctor v. Colonial Refrigerated Transportatio~
Inc., 494 F. 2d 89 (Fourth Cir. 1974), the plaintiff
sustained serious injuries in an accident while riding
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as a passenger in a tractor-trailer being driven by
E. O. Bales, the owner-lessor of said equipment, to
the defendant Colonial.

Colonial was a certified

interstate motor carrier and the plaintiff was hired
by Bales,

the owner-lessor, as an assistant driver.

The issue was stated by the Court as follows:
"The primary issue upon this appeal
is whether a motor carrier operating
under a certificate from the
Interstate Commerce Commission is
liable to an employee of a lessor
for injuries resulting from the
negligence of the lessor in the
operation of his equipment in the
business of the lessee-carrier."
The Court's holding was as follows:
"As a certified interestate carrier
Colonial was subject to the
supervision and con~rol of the
Interstate Commerce Commission,
and in augmenting its equipment
through the lease agreement with
Bales, it was required to be in
compliance with the Commission's
regulations, 49 C.F.R. §1057.11057.6. These regulations and
the statute under which they were
promulgated require and provide
that under such lease arrangements
the lessee-carriers "will have full
direction and control of such
[leased] vehicles and will be fully
responsible for.the operation
thereof . . . as if they were the
owners of such vehicles . .
These regulations were promulgated
by the Commission to correct
widespread abuses incident to the
use of leased equipment by the
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carriers, see American Truckin_g
Association v. United States,
3 4 4 U. S . 2 9 8 , 3 0 3 , 7 3 S . Ct . 3 O7 ,
97 L. Ed. 337 (1953) , and the
"intent [of the regulations] was
to make sure that licensed
carriers would be responsible in
fact, as well as in law, for the
maintenance of leased equipment
and the supervision of borrowed
drivers." Alford v. Major, 470
F. 2d 132, 135 (7 Cir. 1972).
The statute and regulatory
pattern clearly eliminates the
independent contractor concept
from such lease arrangements and
casts upon Colonial full
responsiblity for the negligence
of Bales as driver of the leased
equipment. Any language to the
contrary in the lease agreement
would be violative of the spirit
and letter of the Federal
regulations and therefore
unenforceable .
CONCLUSION
It is respctfully submitted that Max L. Wynn
was outside the

cour~e

of his employment at the time

of his fatal accident and that the decision to return
to Clearfield rather than proceed directly to
California was not to the benefit of his employer and
should not be imposed upon Charles Kinne.

It is

further submitted that Charles Kinne statutorily was
not the employer of Max L. Wynn and therefore has no
liability.
DATED this

_

'>6__

~day

of June, 1979.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Attorney
1 ,-

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed copies of the
foregoing Brief of Plaintiff, postage prepaid, to the
following at the addresses listed below.
Ten copies

Utah Supreme Court
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84114

Two copies

Utah Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84114

Two copies

Andrew R. Hurley
Attorney at Law
1011 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84111

Two copies

Robert J. Shaughnessy
P.O. Box 963
84110
Salt Lake City, UT

Two copies

Anthony M. Thurber
211 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT

MAILED this

/9~day

84111

of June, 1979.

~~~p

EEENCHRIENSEN, Secretar

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

